Early one year has passed since WikiLeaks released Stratfor’s internal email via the hacktivist group, Anonymous. By now, this story should have inspired public discussions on any number of fronts: journalistic ethics, whether private intelligence-gathering companies that use bribery to gain privileged information from politically exposed persons (PEPs) should fall under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and whether governments and their employees should be held accountable for supporting such activities, to name but a few. Yet the current crop of thought leaders appears to be avoiding any potentially important policy issues that might underlie this incident.

**BLACK OPS NGOs**

Stratfor illustrates the post-9/11 wave of private cybermercenaries—for-profit organizations that sell cyberservices to risk-averse and fearful businesses and governments. Although the psychology behind this mindset may be the more interesting topic and will likely be the subject of social science treatises, essays, and monographs for decades, we’ll limit our present discussion to the cyber side of things.

The missions behind the current crop of cybermercenaries seem to fit within the following continuum:

1. **intelligence gathering**—basically the same investigation plus analysis activities usually associated with law enforcement, perhaps with an increased level of sophistication in real-time reporting and analysis, just-in-time briefings of impending events, back-end data mining, and so forth. This activity may involve illegal behavior such as the bribery, extortion, and blackmail of PEPs.

2. **cyberespionage and cybersurveillance**—again, basically what law enforcement does, only privately and with neither oversight nor court orders.

3. **cyberweapons manufacturing or deployment**—either licensed to clients or used offensively by developer.

From what I can tell from the WikiLeaks documents, Stratfor is primarily in the first group—along with HBGary Federal (now part of ManTech) and Palantir on their best behavior. The third group is also easy to populate (thanks again to the Anonymous folks). Players in this space include HBGary and the Gamma Group. The second group is harder to define because it draws talent from the other groups. For example, as the “URL Pearls” sidebar describes, some of the software developed by HBGary and the Gamma Group was designed for cyber-espionage and cybersurveillance, and some of the activities of Stratfor, HBGary, and Palantir under such innocuous-sounding rubrics as “predictive policing” involve surveillance.

It should be noted that the activities in (1) and (2) fall within the domain of statutory investigative agencies such as the police and FBI. I note here that accurate classification of cybermercenaries is difficult for outsiders because of the secrecy under which they operate—well outside the sphere of statutory authority and beyond the reach of the media—kind of like a National Security Agency but without the tax support.

This parallels the proliferation of corporate mercenaries—private armies, private military contractors, private security contractors—such as Academi (formerly Xe Services, Blackwater) and Triple Canopy. For the moment, the cyber side seems to remain largely decoupled, but I predict that, in time, these interests will converge into one-size-fits-all, general-purpose private army/police/intelligence-for-hire concerns. Experiments at such integration have already occurred—see the Computer Sciences Corporation, which owned the private military contractor DynCorp from 2003 to 2005. Not surprisingly, as Figure 1 indicates, some of these companies have been known to target WikiLeaks.
The Stratfor website states that “Stratfor is a subscription-based provider of geopolitical analysis. ... Unlike traditional news outlets, Stratfor uses a unique, intelligence-based approach to gathering information via rigorous open-source monitoring and a global network of human sources.” Founded in 1996 by George Friedman, this Austin, Texas, company “publishes analysis via ... website and customized email updates.” It isn’t clear that much of what Stratfor does with its “intelligence” is particularly interesting or controversial, but the way that it gets its “intelligence” is both interesting and controversial, as is evident from the WikiLeaks revelations.

As the press release from Stratfor’s founder, shown in Figure 2, indicates, Stratfor’s expressed objection to the Anonymous/WikiLeaks exposé is that it was “illegal” and a “breach of privacy.” Let’s see if we have this right: Stratfor is claiming that there’s something wrong with illegal breaches of privacy or the dissemination of information that has been obtained without the information owner’s permission.

Ponder that for a while. It seems to me to be a clear case of pots and kettles, snakes and crabs, or brambles and pomegranates. Let’s try to put it into some sort of meaningful perspective.

While the mainstream press has extensively covered WikiLeaks for several years now, Stratfor has operated largely in the dark. Many of us had never heard of Stratfor before the Anonymous hack of December 2011, so let’s offer the following short review for the benefit of the uninitiated.

Stratfor’s avowed goal is to become “the world’s leading private intelligence organization.” This is expressly stated in one of CEO George Friedman’s leaked emails (5 September 2011, with the subject line “Labor Day Review of Where We Are”). This is also the email in which Friedman announced to Stratfor employees the StratCAP partnership with Shea Morentz, then managing director of Goldman Sachs, who invested several million dollars in Stratfor to create actionable intelligence useful to investors in exchange for a Stratfor board seat. Apparently this deal soured.

Stratfor uses global informants. According to some media reports, at least some of these informants are paid via Swiss bank accounts and prepaid debit cards.

Stratfor serves global corporations and agencies. A quick review of the “GB Master Client List” spreadsheet dated 3-15-07 is a who’s who of financial institutions, government contractors, technology companies, and Forbes 1,000 companies, including Coke, Wexford Capital, Perot Systems, Dow Chemical, and Northrup Grumman.

According to Friedman, Stratfor is not above innovative means to conn...
control its sources: “If this is a source you suspect may have value, you have to take control of [sic] him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control to the point where he would reveal his sourcing and be tasked.” This email is dated 6 December 2011 and went to a Stratfor intelligence analyst regarding an informant’s report on the health of Hugo Chavez.

Regarding relationships with the media, Stratfor works with media organizations and journalists whom it refers to as (among other things) “confederation partners.” It’s not at all obvious that a private intelligence organization’s close relation with the media satisfies the standards of journalistic ethics taught in the academy.

With those few clarifications in mind, I offer for your consideration Table 1 as a modest comparison of Stratfor and WikiLeaks in terms of their operations and objectives.

I’ve based Table 1 on information available from mainstream media reports and analysis of the WikiLeaks documents. Assuming that this is a fair characterization, and based on what you know about WikiLeaks and

Table 1. Comparison of WikiLeaks and Stratfor operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>WikiLeaks</th>
<th>Stratfor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue model</td>
<td>Not for profit</td>
<td>For profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary constituency served</td>
<td>Media/individuals</td>
<td>Corporations/agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeks access to nonpublic, proprietary, or classified information, for which the owner does not authorize access</td>
<td>Under dispute</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies on a leak-centric communication network</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System built on paid informants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses active intelligence systems: leakers, spies, whistleblowers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing to corrupt media resources</td>
<td>Perhaps</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners with media to inform public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides intelligence to media/public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides actionable intelligence to partners in military industrial complex</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black ops</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses third-party contractors (spies)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls sources via money, sex, blackmail, extortion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of risks to society</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Covert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stratfor, which group seems to you to be the greater threat to society?

THE BRIGHT SIDE

Good journalists are always concerned about the possibility of accidentally disseminating erroneous information. At this point, I haven’t seen a single report from any source that I deem credible that claims the WikiLeaks Stratfor emails are bogus. I encourage everyone to look into these leaked documents, and the concomitant media coverage, and come to their own conclusion.

The Stratfor revelations are alarming for at least two reasons. First, I’m not convinced that Stratfor’s approach to intelligence analytics will lead to significantly better decision making than we’ve come to expect from the military industrial complex, and I’m fearful that unenlightened leadership may be lulled into overreliance on such analyses. That might in turn lead to even more ill-advised decisions. Second, I’m bothered by the lack of oversight and transparency in the process. From the email, it appears that Stratfor has introduced a corrupting influence on the process of intelligence gathering.

The question that informed world citizens should ask is whether they feel comfortable with their governments supporting such things. It should be emphasized that there is a reason why governments and businesses outsource this kind of work. Is it due to the fact that dedicated private companies are so much better at it? Or do the customers and clients want to maintain distance from, and deniability of, putatively illegal activity.

There is no obvious Fourth Amendment protection against private shadow intelligence agencies, just as there is no First Amendment protection against PayPal banning books. While the constitutional lawyers argue the legality, the public should be discussing whether or to what extent Stratfor’s activities are consistent with democratic values and the rule of law, and whether government agencies should be tolerating it, much less encouraging it. I’m not sure that a “trust us” defense should be any more compelling to society in this case than when it was used to defend flawless efficient markets before the most recent economic meltdown.

One final observation: it’s unlikely that any of this would have become public were it not for Anonymous. But that’s a topic for another column.

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